Book Chapter
Huh, Seung-Uk and Matthew Winters. “Development Policy.” 2021. In Jon Pevehouse and Leonard Seabrooke, eds. The Oxford Handbook of International Political Economy. New York: Oxford University Press.
A variety of policies implemented by the wealthy countries of the world can have an impact on economic development in poor countries. We argue that the field of international political economy has underinvested in studying the determinants of non-foreign-aid policies that affect development. We review literature from a set of eight policy areas where there are identifiable development consequences and discuss the findings of the International Political Economy (IPE) literature with regard to policy origins, changes, and consequences. We find a consistent role of non-governmental organization (NGO) pressure on wealthy-country governments in bringing about pro-development policies, although we also identify instances where pro-development policies originate in domestic and strategic interests. Overall, we argue that there is significant space for additional exploration through a development lens of how policies come into being in the wealthy countries of the world.
Under Review
Partisan Governments and the Resolution of Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Abstract
Why do some states settle investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) claims more frequently than others? This study examines how government partisanship influences the settlement of different types of ISDS claims, arising from either major or minor property rights infringements. I argue that left-leaning governments, closely aligned with labor interests that generally favor foreign investment, are more inclined to settle ISDS claims arising from serious infringements on property rights than right-leaning governments. Conversely, the preference of left-leaning partisans for state regulatory autonomy leads these governments to be less likely to settle claims emerging from minor breaches, such as policy regulations affecting foreign investment values, than right-leaning governments. Using original hand-coded data on the level of international investment agreement (IIA) breaches between 1987 and 2022, I find that left-leaning governments are more likely to settle ISDS claims arising from serious government actions violating IIAs.
Presentations: APSA 2024, ISA 2024, GSIPE 2023, ISA-Midwest 2023
Working Papers
Foreign Aid and Foreign Investment Protection. With Miles D. Williams
Abstract
What foreign policy tool do developed countries employ when a less developed host country expropriates their outward foreign investment? We hypothesize that, in cases where a foreign aid donor-recipient relationship exists between the two countries, wealthy developed countries, leveraging their donor status, punish the expropriating host country by cutting foreign aid, given that aid is an important source of economic development and political stability for many recipients. Utilizing dyadic ODA commitment data, a lagged-DV design with two-way fixed effects, and a seemingly unrelated regressions estimation strategy, we find support for our argument. We observe that not only do expropriation events lead to cuts to foreign aid, these cuts are deepest in humanitarian assistance. We propose that a key mechanism behind this is the fact that countries most likely to engage in expropriation also tend to be among the most poorly governed. Past research shows that these countries receive greater humanitarian aid relative to other forms of assistance because it generally requires less reliance on the recipient government. Perversely, this also means that humanitarian assistance provides the most ready-to-hand tool to punish bad behavior. Further, we find that this effect is localized to a sample that skews significantly toward weak governance.
Presentations: APSA 2023, MPSA 2023, ISA-Midwest 2023
Failed Coup Attempts and Fading FDI in the Extractive Sector. With Do Young Gong
Abstract
How do failed coup attempts impact foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows? While a number of studies have examined the effects of political institutions and violent events on FDI inflows, the impact of failed coup attempts on sectoral FDI inflows has remained unexplored. In this paper, we argue that failed coup attempts lead to a decline in FDI inflows, particularly in the primary sector. Failed coup attempts significantly increase the likelihood of subsequent coup events, prompting leaders to devise various coup-proofing strategies, such as enhancing repressive capabilities and buying off military elites to counter potential coup events. To finance these strategies in a short time span, leaders may prioritize deriving additional revenues from the primary sector, given its relatively straightforward revenue extraction processes. Due to the high risk of losing office from a subsequent coup attempt, leaders may either request additional taxation from foreign investors in the primary sector or choose to expropriate foreign investments in the sector. Both actions may result in a decline in FDI in the sector. Drawing from the International Country Risk Guide dataset, we find that failed coup events increase the risk of violations of investment terms, such as expropriation. Moreover, analyzing sectoral FDI volume data from 1980 to 2008, we observe a decline in FDI inflows within the primary sector in the year following failed coup attempts, whereas this pattern is not observed in the secondary and tertiary sectors.
Presentations: ISA 2025, GSIPE 2024, MPSA 2024
Normative Preferences and Support for International Economic Dispute Settlement
Abstract
Why do some states resolve investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) claims by settlement more frequently than others? This study examines how individual partisanship influences the settlement of different types of ISDS claims, arising from either major or minor property rights infringements. I argue that left-leaning governments, which are closely aligned with labor interests that generally favor foreign investment, are more inclined to settle ISDS claims arising from serious infringements on property rights than right-leaning governments. Conversely, the preference of left-leaning partisans for state regulatory autonomy leads these governments to be less likely to settle claims arising from minor breaches, such as policy regulations affecting foreign investment values, compared to right-leaning governments. Using survey experiments fielded in the United States and Argentina, I examine the micro-foundation of the theory: whether individual partisanship affects the level of support for ISDS settlements. I find that left-leaning respondents in the U.S. survey are more supportive of settling ISDS claims originating from serious government breaches than right-leaning partisans, while left-leaning respondents in Argentina show higher support for settling ISDS claims arising from both serious and less serious government breaches.
Presentations: GSIPE APSA Preconference 2024
Why Wait? Firms, Governments, and the Timing of International Investment Disputes. With Andrew Lugg, Kevin Navarrete-Parra, and Jared Oestman
Abstract
Investors have filed over 1,200 claims alleging violations of international law under the controversial investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system. Yet, contrary to conventional wisdom, ISDS was not designed to be investors ’ only legal remedy, nor do investors immediately escalate all alleged violations to international tribunals. Using newly collected data, we show that the average ISDS claim is filed nearly 3.4 years after the alleged violation (s) and many take 5 years or more, indicating that investors have latitude over how long to wait before filing a claim. We theorize that “ time to file ” is affected by several factors. First, investors are more likely to escalate to ISDS, rather than waiting or pursuing domestic remedies, when economic or political uncertainty is likely to threaten the future profitability of their investment. Second, investors will take longer to file when they view future investments as profitable, as hasty escalation could harm their relationship with the host state. Finally, we theorize that investors are more likely to file claims alleging indirect expropriation as away to deter similar regulatory actions. Statistical analyses of our data support key aspects of our theory, demonstrating that escalation to ISDS is more complex than commonly assumed. Investors do not automatically escalate to ISDS, instead, they make decisions based on the informational and political environments they face
Presentations: APSA 2025, MPSA 2025
Work In Progress
Partisan Governments and the Resolution of WTO Dispute Settlements
Does a Serious Breach of International Investment Agreements Harm FDI More Than a Less Serious Breach?
The Stigma Effect of ISDS Involvement on IMF Conditionality